>> Dr. Lanham:
More excerpts from Greek Theatre. 

There is also a movie in the program tomorrow. 

And then the [unclear dialogue] next week as well. 

And concludes on the first of November, so we hope you'll join us in future sessions.  

This effort, this symposium is to bring to students and to faculty at Eastern the opportunity to think about something else, that perhaps is not on your plate today, but will spark an interest that might lead to future studies or future interest, or future study abroad trip, you never know, but you have started with ancient civilization of Egypt last year in a symposium with about twenty activities so we hope it will bring you forward into something that may not be on your plate today, and how else, what better way to tie several strings together than having a philosopher in your midst.  

And so I think we'll have a treat right off the bat.  

I will ask Dr. Wahby from the School of Technology to present the speaker. 

>> Dr. Wahby:
Welcome to our Futuristic look at Ancient Greece and we are looking as far back as 2000, 3000 years ago when people didn't live this way, but imagine if  [unclear dialogue] and you will see young people and older people looking back to this primitive people in 2012, imagine they used microphones like this, and they had something called [unclear dialogue] and look at technology and how it changes and people always [unclear dialogue] nothing more to do a famous quote from the chair of the invention office in Washington DC in 1899, he said to the government, Close the office, because there are no more patents. 

Everything that can be invented has already been invented. 

Nothing more.  

Please give a round of applause.

>> Dr. Aylesworth:
I am going to be talking about technology today, and I am going to be talking about the connection between our notion of technology and our experience of technology and the ancient Greek concept of techne which actually means something quite different than what we understand the word technology so what I hope to do this afternoon, is to give you a little bit of the background of the history of techne, its origins in Greek civilization, including mythology, believe it or not, Greek tragedy, and of course, philosophy, and then I will shift gears, and talk a little bit about the relationship between techne as the Greeks understood it, and technology as contemporary philosophers have talked about it.  

And I will be talking about several different approaches to contemporary technology from a philosophical point of view, but as I hope you will come to see, even these contemporary discourses about technology have a very direct connection never the less with techne as it is understood by the Greeks. 

Now our modern term technology, wasn't really in use, it does come from the Greek (tech-no-logia) but you don't really see that term in the literature from that time.  

The modern term technology started to appear in the early 1600's right around the time when modern science was starting to establish itself, and it actually meant then a discourse or a treatise on art.  

Or the arts.  

Which does reflect on the origin of the word techne, which did include believe it or not, art, fine art.  

Now in the 19th century, the meaning was narrowed to mean something very much like what people think of now, when they think of technology. 

It came to mean the science of the mechanical and industrial arts, exclusively.  

That is, a considerable narrowing of the meaning from the original sense of techne. 

And this narrowing, it reflects a restriction of the meaning of the word techne in relation to the Greek sense of the word, which was broader, but it also is a clue in terms of the changed experience of the world that took place.  

Words don't just change by themselves.  

Because words don't occur by themselves.  

Words occur in a context, words occur in a world, and a change in the meaning of a word always corresponds to a change in the way human beings have experienced the world generally. 

And that's really what I am going to be talking about.  

The mythological origin of the notion of techne can be traced back to the ancient myth of Epimetheus and Prometheus. 

Everybody has heard of Prometheus. 

Everybody thinks that Prometheus is the great benefactor of human kind, he is the one who stole fire from the gods, and the techne, the skills of metalworking for example, from Hephaestus and Athena gave them to human beings.  

But actually, without his brother, Epimetheus, there would have been no Prometheus.  

Prometheus wouldn't have had to do what he did, if it had not been for Epimetheus.  

Those names also mean something. 

Prometheus, the name, means "foresight" or "forethought". 

Epimetheus, his brother, means "afterthought", "hindsight". 

And that should tell you something about the myth.  

Now there is a version of this myth in the works of Plato, in a dialogue called the Protagoras.  

Plato gives a version of this myth and I am going to quote from a Standard English translation of this passage from Plato's Protagoras.  

The text runs as follows: "Once upon a time there existed gods but no mortal creatures. 

When the appointed time for these also to be born, the gods formed them within the earth out of a mixture of earth and fire and the substances, which are compounded from the earth, and fire. 

And when they were ready to bring them to the light, they charged Prometheus and Epimetheus with the task of equipping them and allotting them suitable powers to each kind.  

Now Epimetheus begged Prometheus to allow him to do the distribution himself, 'And when I am done,' he said, 'you can review it.' 

So he persuaded him and set to work."  

Now, Epimetheus was not a particularly clever person.  

These are gods, actually. 

They are titans. 


"And before he realized it, he had used up all the available powers on the beasts, and being left with the human race on it hands, unprovided for, did not know what to do with them.  

Prometheus came to inspect the work and found the other animals well off for everything, but man was left naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed, and already the appointed day had come when man, too, was to emerge from within the earth into the daylight.  

Prometheus therefore, being at a loss to provide any means of salvation for man, stole from Hephaestus and Athena the gift of skill, in the arts, the Greek text is [unclear dialogue] technical wisdom, actually, together with fire. 

For without fire, it was impossible for anyone to possess or use the skill.  And bestowed it on man.  

In this way man acquired sufficient resources to keep him alive.  

Since then, man had a share in the portion of the gods in the first place, because of his divine kinship, he alone among living creatures believed in gods. 

And set to work to build altars, and images of them.  

Secondly by the art, techne, which they possessed, men soon discovered articulate speech, and names and invented houses, and clothes, and shoes, and bedding, and got food from the earth. "

So that's from the Protagoras standard edition, pages 320 - 322. 

If any of you want to look that up.  

So that's a pretty fair account of the myth. 

It is interesting that the myth attributes language, the invention of language to this original sense of techne, a language probably more often than techne, is understood in the philosophical tradition to be what distinguishes human beings from say, brute animals.  

But the myth of Prometheus, and Epimetheus says it is techne and language itself is a techne.  

How should we interpret this myth?  

Well, the interpretation I would suggest is this: Traditionally we take the myth to indicate the position of human beings neither brute beasts, nor gods, but something in between. 

And this accounts for the fact, that unlike the animals humans must live by their own artifice, rather than by simple nature, and that while fire and technical skills are divine and mark the superiority of humans over the animals, humans are in another sense, deficient in their origin, and inferior to animals as a natural beings. 

Unlike the animals who are self sufficient in their naturalness, and unlike the gods, who are self sufficient in their divinity, humans are out of joint with nature, and are born out of transgressions against the gods, and thus they seem to lack the boundaries that are proper to other beings. 

And this notion of surpassing boundaries is a theme that comes up in contemporary discourses about technology as well.  

Another Greek text that will give us a sense of the place of techne and what it means for human beings is found in a famous chorus from Antigone, "The Tragedy" by Sophocles.  

This is a standard translation from that chorus and it runs as follows: 

"Many the wonders but nothing walks stranger than man, this thing crosses the sea in the winter storm, making its path through the roaring waves.  

And she the greatest of the gods, the earth, ageless she is, and unwearied, he wears he away as the plows go up and down from year to year and his mules turn up the soil.  

Danations of birds he snares and leads wild beasts tribes and the salty brood of the sea with the twisted mesh of his nets, this clever man, he controls with craft, the beasts of the open air, walkers on hills, the horse with his shaggy mane, he holds and harnesses, yoked about the neck, and the strong bull of the mountain.  

Language and thought like the wind, and the feelings that make a city, he has taught himself, and shelter against the cold refuge from rain, he can always help himself. 

He faces no future helpless.  

There's only death that he cannot escape from. 

His contrived refuge from illnesses is once beyond all cure.  

Clever beyond all dreams, the inventive craft, the techne, that he has which may drive him one time or another to well or ill, when he honors the laws of the land, and the gods warn right, high indeed his city, but stateless the man who dares to dwell with dishonor.  

Not by my fire, never to share my thoughts who does these things."

So, there again, we have the inclusion of language as a techne, and the sense that techne is what distinguishes the human beings among all the other beings and the Greek word for this, in this text is [unclear dialogue] 'the strangest of the strange'.  

Man is the strangest of the strange.  

Now in Aristotle, we have perhaps the most detailed attempt to understand techne conceptually, as a type of knowledge, and to distinguish it from other types of knowledge and Aristotle does this in book six of the Nicomachean Ethics, that's the place where you'll find the most extensive account from him, here he distinguishes art or techne as technical skill from what the Greeks call episteme', which means scientific knowledge, in their sense, that means knowledge of things that do not change.  

Mathematical knowledge for example in Plato it means knowledge of the eternal forms.  

In addition to techne and episteme', Aristotle says human beings practice from Mesis' which is prudence or moral judgment, and so Sophia, which is philosophical wisdom, and Neuse, which is intuitive reason.  

So, techne is just one way that human beings know things, or know how to do things.  

Now, generally in Aristotle, techne is any skilled activity whose purpose is external to the activity itself that involves deliberation, and pertains only to things that can be other than they are.  

They can either be or not be.  

Episteme' on the other hand, is the knowledge of things that are necessary, and do not change, they are not subject to deliberation, and therefore, and Sophia is wisdom for it's own sake.  

That's one of its distinguishing features according to Aristotle.  

He says that in his metaphysics, that what makes this knowledge Sophia superior to all the others, is that it is for it's own sake, it is completely self-sufficient, it has no purpose outside of itself.  

Whereas, techne does not derive its purpose from itself.  

It is in the service of a purpose outside of its own activity.  

That is how Aristotle characterizes it. 

And a shift has occurred precisely there in that relationship according to some of the philosophers I will be talking about in a minute.  

Now, these differences notwithstanding, the practices of techne, include a very broad range of activities.  

They include things like sandal making, medicine, state crafts, which is the art of ruling, household management, which is the original meaning of economics, playing a musical instrument, erecting a temple, priest craft, writing a tragedy, commanding an army, all of these things are called techne.  

Writing a poem is also called techne. 

We should know that many of the technai, have nothing to do with mechanics, or with manufacturing an object. 

Some of them do, but a lot of them don't.  

It's really the modern view that assumes that technology has to do with gadgets and machinery, and producing objects, and so on. 

Now, while Greek philosophers do not always distinguish between techne and other forms of knowledge, Plato and Aristotle both prefer contemplative knowledge, or knowledge of what is changeless and is considered to be good for it's own sake, because it is more self sufficient, and therefore, more divine. 

Above and beyond mere techne, which pertains to things that may or may not be in which serves utilitarian, purposes only.  

So there's a use of techne in the Greeks themselves that is somewhat narrower and that does mean mere utilitarian activity as opposed to the higher types of knowledge and wisdom.  

As Aristotle remarks, all art is concerned with coming into being, that is with contriving and concerting how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made.  

That's a standard translation, but it is a little deceptive.  

Because the word that Aristotle is using, the word gets translated as making is [unclear dialogue], and yes, it can mean that, but more basically it means bringing into being.  

It doesn't just mean manufacturing, or making in that sense, it's not restricted to the sense of constructing, producing an object of some kind.  

It can include that, but it actually has a broader meaning, to bring it being. 

And that is shown in the fact the [unclear dialogue] is also described, it is also the word used to describe the bringing into being the things in nature.  

That is also called [unclear dialogue], things that occur naturally, things that are not constructed or produced by human beings.  

I am going to shift now into our more contemporary discourses about technology.  

The most influential philosopher in recent times, to say something about technology, is without a doubt, Martin Heidegger, the German philosopher.  

He lived from 1889 to 1976.  

One of the most, perhaps the most, influential philosopher of the twentieth century, still influential now.  

He wrote a landmark essay in 1953, called "The Question Concerning Technology".  

Virtually all the other philosophers I will mention here make reference to Heidegger in this regard. 

In the essay, he advances two famous theses. 

One, the essence of technology is nothing technological. 

The essence of technology is nothing technological.  

And contrary to received opinion, the essence of modern technology is historically earlier than the development of modern science.  

The received view is that modern technology came a little bit later through the application of modern science to industry and so on.  

And in a sense of course that is true.  

But we think of it as modern technology started to appear in the 19th century when you had factories, and railroads and telegraph systems, and so on.  

Whereas, modern science developed before that. 

It started developing in the 1600's.  

But Heidegger says no, the essence of technology was already operating when science, modern science started.  

It was technological from the very beginning. 

In the first part of the essay, Heidegger traces the narrowing of the meaning of Techne through the translation of Greek words and concepts into Latin, by the Romans, and particularly the translation of the Greek word Ition which means literally, that to which something else is indebted, or to which it owes its being.  

Translated into the mechanical notion of [unclear dialogue] the efficient cause. 

Which Heidegger says it is not a Greek notion, that word, that concept does not exist, for the Greeks, it is a roman concept and we moderns simply took it from them, and we simply assume that because the romans called this [unclear dialogue] that's what the Greeks meant, but Heidegger says that isn't what they meant. 

They didn't mean that at all.  

But this notion of cause became the predominant sense of cause in modern physics. 

And on this basis, techne would be a causal means for producing and effect, which is the common understanding of technology in the modern world, but that all occurred through an intermediary translation of the Greek notion, into Latin, and then into modern languages.  

Heidegger claims that beneath[00:23:14;09] this translation and narrowing of meaning, something more profound has occurred. 

Rather than understanding modern technology in the most common way, that is, as the putting in the use of modern science, he says there has been a transformation in our experience of nature itself, and contrast to traditional technology, which makes passive use of energies provided by the wind or by rivers, moving water, modern technology set upon and challenges nature in order to unlock energy stored within it.  

I am now going to read a passage from this essay, "The Question Concerning Technology". This is Heidegger’s description of what modern technology does to our experience of the world generally.  

"Attractive land is challenged in the hauling out of coal and ore. 

The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district the soil as a mineral deposit, the field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and maintain.  

The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field, and sowing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase.  

But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting in order, which sets upon nature, agriculture is now the mechanized food industry.  

Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium for example, uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be unleashed either for destructive, or for peaceful purposes.'" 

Now if this passage sounds a little bit like in its tone, the Chorus from Antigone, that is not a coincidence.  

Heidegger translated that chorus himself a couple of different times, and commented on it extensively in another, a book, which is actually a lecture series from 1935, called "Introduction of Metaphysics". 

So, obviously, the sense of techne, from Antigone was very influential in Heidegger’s own thinking.  

This challenging and unlocking of nature says Heidegger is also an expediting that drives toward the maximum yield at the minimum expense. 

So there's an economy at work in this experience as well, such as the calculative logic of a technological system that has closed upon itself.  

And that's what the Greeks never would have experienced. 

They never would have experienced technology as an entire system of interrelated relationships that closed upon itself. 

Became total and complete unto itself.  

They would never have conceived of such a thing.  

Heidegger declares that this is the essence of technology. 

Not the collection of mechanical devices, but a calculative network in which nature is already ordered as a standing reserve of resources to be extracted, stored, distributed, and used up.  

His name for this essence is the enframing [unclear dialogue].  

The enframing was already projected at the advent of modern physics, he says, when figures such as Galileo understood nature in terms of a system of unobservable, but calculative causes that produced observable effects.  

That's the modern scientific revolution.  

Galileo being a central figure there.  

In the 18th century Immanuel Kant commented upon this when he described modern science that is modern physics, as the projection of a rational plan according to which nature would be forced to give evidence, much like a judge presiding over witnesses in a trial.  

In other words, modern physics does not just observe, Greek science was observational also, but it wasn't experimental. 

The distinguishing feature of modern science then is that it is experimental in this projective sense of framing around nature at the outset of one's investigations, a conceptual system.  

According to which, it is already decided what will count as evidence and what won't count as evidence.  

So we've already decided this even before we begin to observe, we've already decided we are the judges in terms of what will count and what won't count.  

That's what experiment actually means to Kant and also I should say to Heidegger, hence science is already technological, because it is calculative, not just in the sense of mathematical measurement, but in the sense of planning and control.  

For this reason, Heidegger declares modern physics is the herald of the enframing, a herald whose providence is still unknown.  

He cannot, Heidegger says he cannot explain how this suddenly happened. 

How we came to this shift in our understanding of nature.  

That remains to be thought through.  

But, here, he says, the essence of modern technology is already occurring.  

In accordiance with this essence, Heidegger finds that humans are continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and promulgating nothing but what is revealed in ordering and deriving all standards on this basis.  

And that would mean humans would predominately experience themselves as part of the standing reserve of nature, to be ordered about and directed toward calculative efficiency in all matters.  

Sound familiar?  

I was a department chair for nine years, had to write lots of reports and they were generally about efficiency.  

This is what Heidegger sees as the supreme danger of the technological essence. 

A danger that cannot be avoided simply by better planning and control. 

Instead Heidegger suggests that the appropriate encounter to this danger might be a recovering of the Greek sense of techne, especially in it's inclusion of art as in fine art, within it's way of knowing. 

For art is a way of revealing things that allows it to come forth out of themselves instead of subjecting them to a calculative framework.  

So Heidegger thinks yeah, we will be better off if we recover this sense of Greek Techne that includes art, so that we don't see things entirely within this calculative framework, but we also have another way of experiencing things that is not within that framework.  

Other philosophers since Heidegger has had some interesting things to say about this.  

A common theme among all of them is the turning point when technology becomes a closed, and indeed, a global system with a technical means of calculation and control, closed upon themselves and invert the ends/means relationships specified by Aristotle.  

In this instance, the means, project their own ends.  

That's something Aristotle said can't happen in techne. 

The goal or the purpose of the activity of techne is outside of the activity itself, recent philosopher have said in modern technology that is not so.  

The activity itself projects its own goals and standards.  

Calculability and functional efficiency above all else. 

When this happens human needs and requirement’s are subject to the law of maximum performance.  

Thinkers from the so-called Frankfort school, for example, have made this point in their concept of the dialectic of enlightenment where modern techniques in planning and control shift in nature to the management of society.  

And when this shift is made, these same techniques, which are otherwise beneficial in liberating for us, they become oppressive to human freedom. 

Others such as the French philosopher Jean Francois Lyotard focuses upon the most recent revolution in science and technology, in other words, the digitalization of knowledge and information, an event Heidegger himself had foreseen.  

At one point in his famous essay, Heidegger says eventually all of modern science will be one science called cybernetics.  

He said that in 1953.  

That was pretty prescient of him.  

Lyotard characterizes this as the post-modern condition which is the world where even modern notions of human emancipation and subjective freedom are being dissolved by computerization and the mediation of experience through networks of communication and exchange.  

But unlike Heidegger, in the Frankfort school of thinkers, Lyotard sees another possibility for freedom in the power of invention, or paralogy, he says, which the system needs in order to produce knowledge that is new.  

Right?  

The system is also the current system of capital and there's a constant demand for more and new capital. 

Lyotard says that means we have to keep producing new knowledge, what does new knowledge mean now?  

It means new ways to gather and encode and encrypt and decrypt information.  

There's a demand to find ever-new ways to do that. 

In other words, the systems demand for new knowledge produces by itself resistance to it's totalizing drive toward functional efficiency.  

The new will always occur as noise in the current system, and will keep the system open by producing disequilibrium.  

So Lyotard isn't afraid that the system will ever achieve complete closure, because the very same system demands new ways, new moves within the rules of the existing system. 

And that will always provide possibilities for reinvention for moves in the games, as he would say, that haven't been made before.  

In the last thinker I want to talk about today, is also the youngest. 

He is my age, actually.  

I've met him a couple of times, interesting guy. 

His name is Ben Steigler, he has a German name, but his is French.  

And he has produced and is producing a series of books under the heading of 'Techniques and Time'.  

The first volume of that series is called, "The Fault of Epimetheus." 

So Steigler, we've come full circle back to the myth of Epimetheus and Prometheus.  

In this work, Steigler revisits the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus and concludes that it is a lesson about a prosthetic origin of the human. 

In other words, we don't have a real origin, we have a substitute origin, and that substitute origin is the origin, right?  

Paradoxically speaking.  

In other words, the human being does not pose itself upon the world through technology, but the human being is produced through technology in the first place.  

That we are made technologically, or technically, ourselves.  

Our Epimethean origin is an origin of fault.  

A lack that is more original than any moment of fulfillment. 

Hence, it is not self-sufficient, [unclear dialogue] or wisdom that most distinguishes us as human, but the invention of ourselves through the externalization in supplementation of our origin in techne.  

In order to retain our humanity, Steigler argues, we must ourselves, remember what our traditions have forgotten.  

The forgetfulness of Epimetheus as the event of origin that we must continually recover in order to remain human.  

Steigler makes a lot over the fact that we remember Prometheus, but we forget his brother Epimetheus, who is the one who forgot, and is the one who created the situation in the first place, where humans had to be supplemented before they could come to the light of day.  

Precisely this recovery of immemorable event is threatened by the techniques of memory that prevail today.  

This is how Steigler understands contemporary technology, or techniques. 

He says it is nemo-techniques. 

It's the techniques of memory. 

Current techniques according to him, is a techniques of speed in which events are presented in so-called real-time, which as it turns out, isn't real at all, that's his point, whether the events immediacy is technically produced in an event before the event, as it were.  

The event appears immediate but it really isn't. 

It's technically produced, but that event of production is not something that seems to be there, because the event we see and experience seems to be immediate.  

However, the gap between the event and its pre-immediate production is beyond human experience and memory, and thus the event's temporization remains on thought and that's the challenge for us today. 

He believes, I am going to quote then a passage from that first book, "The Fault of Epimetheus". 

'Today, memory is the object of industrial exploitation, that is also a warp of speed.  

From the computer to program industries in general via the cognitive sciences, the techniques of virtual reality in tele-presence together with the biotechnology from the media event to the event of technisized life, via the interactive event that makes up computer real-time, new condition of eventization have been put in place that characterize what we have called light time. 

Light time is simply that sense of immediate transmission of data. 

Right, at the speed of light.  

There is therefore, a pressing need for a politics of memory, this politics would be nothing but a rethinking of techniques of the on-thought of the immemorial that would call for reflection on the originary default of origin which we call Epimetheus, not Prometheus."  

For Steigler, the fault of origin must be recalled and reenacted by human beings, so they may invent their unique singularity, which would remain incalculable and unplannable and open to a future that is not programmable because it would also be a repetition of the originary default or lack, you can't program that.’ 

That's his point, and that's what we have to keep open if we are going to remain human, in his view.  

All right, what can we conclude from these remarks? 

Well, this is what I would suggest.  

The lesson of the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus, the history of the concept of techne, and the more recent philosophical reflections on technology, is neither condemnatory, nor naively optimistic.  

It is neither one.  

The point is not to reject technology as a monstrous power that destroys a more perfect order of things that existed in the past, because it didn't, nor to celebrate technology as a way to utopia in the future, because it isn't.  

Instead, we should understand that techne is inseparable from the humanity that is at risk in the technological enframing as Heidegger would say, and that the inhumanity of technology is itself a possibility of the human and arises from the same essential default or lack that makes us who we are in the first place.  

[applause] 

>> Dr. Wahby:
We have 50 seconds for questions, anybody? 

They have a big meal down at the food court. 

Just a quick question. 

What we call technology now, doing things with systems and so forth, is not what they meant by techne? 

>> Dr. Aylesworth:
Not at all. 

>> Dr. Wahby:
What did they call inventions and doing what we do now what we call technology, did they have another term?

>> Dr. Aylesworth:
They called it techne, but it didn't include the sense of a total system. 

Right. Where you had an entire world that was subject to systematic planning and calculations and control. 

>> Dr. Wahby:
What they say techne is more comprehensive, more over reaching than ours, because ours is limited to these,

>> Dr. Aylesworth:
Yes, and no.  

It's a broader term, but there's no one sense of techne that applies to the whole world.  

Whereas, in our modern experience, our sense of techne or technology is a narrower one than the Greeks, but it has this global scope.  

And that makes it a different beast. 

>> Dr. Wahby:
Thank you. 

Any other questions?  

>> Attendee:
Is there some less abstract way of understanding how humans are products of the technology, as opposed to 

>> Dr. Aylesworth:
Less abstract.  

Well, I guess I'll have to pick somebody to talk about here. 

Maybe Stigler.  

He says that the human being, the being that we are would not be possible without some kind of prosthetic assistance in the way in which we exist.  

We cannot be human if we cannot externalize our being in things like texts in things like memorials, in things like institutions, the so-called external world.  

All of that he says, is a nemo-technic. 

It's a technique of memory, because it reflects a past that we can appropriate, but we never lived it ourselves.  

Right?  

The historical tradition, the infrastructure we live in, I mean, I didn't build this building, did you?  

But it was constructed; it's of the remnant of the past.  

And we use it, we appropriate it, and so on, and in that regard, we are employing a nemo-technics.  

So the building is, this building isn't just a building, it is an archive. 

It's an archive of memory. 

>> Dr. Wahby:
When I think of our freedom and say that our distinguished speaker will welcome any emails from you with other questions, so please write him with your questions.  

>> Dr. Aylesworth:
Thanks!  I'll do my best; I'll do my best if they come in.  

>> Dr. Wahby:
Give him a round of applause.